The increasing adoption of hydrogen as a clean energy carrier has made its infrastructure a critical component of the global energy transition. However, the digitization and interconnectivity of hydrogen production plants, pipelines, and refueling stations expose them to cybersecurity threats. Malicious actors targeting these systems could disrupt supply chains, cause operational failures, or even trigger safety incidents. Addressing these risks requires robust regulatory frameworks and cybersecurity best practices tailored to hydrogen infrastructure.

Hydrogen production facilities, including electrolyzers and steam methane reforming plants, rely on industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems for automation. These systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks such as ransomware, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and unauthorized access. A breach could manipulate process parameters, leading to inefficient production, equipment damage, or hazardous conditions. For example, altering pressure or temperature controls in an electrolysis plant could result in system failures or leaks.

Pipelines transporting hydrogen face similar risks. Modern pipeline networks use sensors and remote monitoring systems to regulate flow and detect leaks. Cyber intrusions could falsify sensor data, disable safety mechanisms, or manipulate compressor stations, potentially causing supply disruptions or integrity breaches. Unlike natural gas pipelines, hydrogen pipelines require additional considerations due to hydrogen’s smaller molecular size and higher permeability, which may influence material choices and leak detection systems.

Refueling stations, particularly those with automated payment and dispensing systems, are another target. Compromised software could allow unauthorized access to customer data, disrupt fueling operations, or tamper with safety interlocks. As hydrogen refueling networks expand, ensuring secure communication between stations and centralized management systems becomes crucial.

To mitigate these threats, regulatory frameworks such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework and the European Union’s Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive provide structured approaches. The NIST framework, widely adopted in the U.S., outlines five core functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. For hydrogen infrastructure, this means conducting risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities, implementing access controls, deploying intrusion detection systems, and establishing incident response plans.

The NIS Directive, applicable in the EU, designates hydrogen infrastructure as an operator of essential services (OES) in some member states, mandating compliance with stringent cybersecurity measures. Operators must report significant incidents, perform regular security audits, and adopt state-of-the-art protective measures. The directive’s risk management approach aligns with the NIST framework but includes stricter reporting requirements and oversight by national cybersecurity authorities.

A key challenge in applying these frameworks to hydrogen systems is the lack of sector-specific guidelines. While existing standards cover general industrial cybersecurity, hydrogen’s unique properties necessitate tailored protocols. For instance, encryption standards for data transmitted between hydrogen storage facilities and control centers must account for real-time operational demands. Similarly, authentication mechanisms for remote pipeline monitoring should balance security with the need for rapid response during emergencies.

Another consideration is supply chain security. Hydrogen infrastructure components, such as electrolyzers and compressors, often incorporate software and hardware from global suppliers. Ensuring these components are free from vulnerabilities or backdoors requires rigorous vendor assessments and adherence to secure development practices. The NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) offers guidance, but hydrogen operators must enforce these standards across their supply chains.

Human factors also play a role in cybersecurity. Phishing attacks and social engineering remain common entry points for breaches. Training personnel to recognize threats and follow secure protocols is essential. Regular drills simulating cyber incidents can improve readiness and reduce response times.

Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and blockchain present opportunities to enhance cybersecurity in hydrogen systems. AI-driven anomaly detection can identify unusual patterns in network traffic or process data, flagging potential intrusions. Blockchain could secure transactions in hydrogen trading platforms or verify the integrity of sensor data across distributed infrastructure. However, these technologies must be carefully integrated to avoid introducing new vulnerabilities.

International collaboration is critical for harmonizing cybersecurity regulations. Hydrogen supply chains often cross borders, requiring consistent standards to prevent weak links. Organizations such as the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) are developing guidelines, but progress depends on industry and government cooperation.

In summary, cybersecurity regulations for hydrogen infrastructure must address the unique risks posed by production plants, pipelines, and refueling stations. Frameworks like NIST and the NIS Directive provide a foundation, but sector-specific adaptations are needed. Key measures include securing ICS/SCADA systems, protecting supply chains, training personnel, and leveraging advanced technologies. As hydrogen’s role in the energy system grows, proactive cybersecurity strategies will be vital to ensuring reliability, safety, and public trust.