Modern battery safety systems are critical infrastructures that require robust cybersecurity measures to prevent malicious attacks that could lead to catastrophic failures. Unlike Battery Management Systems (BMS), which focus on operational performance and cell-level monitoring, safety systems prioritize fail-safe mechanisms such as thermal runaway prevention, emergency shutdown, and hazard containment. The implementation of cybersecurity in these systems must adhere to stringent standards like IEC 62443, incorporate network segmentation for protection relays, and enforce firmware signing for shutdown systems to ensure integrity and availability.

IEC 62443 is a globally recognized standard for industrial communication network security, providing a framework for assessing and mitigating risks in operational technology (OT) environments. For battery safety systems, compliance involves defining security zones and conduits to isolate critical components. For example, protection relays responsible for disconnecting faulty battery modules must operate within a segmented network to prevent lateral movement by attackers. This segmentation limits exposure to threats originating from less secure areas, such as enterprise IT networks or third-party monitoring tools.

Network segmentation for protection relays involves deploying firewalls, virtual LANs (VLANs), and unidirectional gateways to enforce strict communication policies. A case study from a grid-scale energy storage facility demonstrated that an unsegmented network allowed a ransomware attack to propagate from a compromised SCADA system to safety relays, delaying a critical shutdown command. After implementing IEC 62443-aligned segmentation, the facility reduced its attack surface by 78%, as measured by penetration testing.

Firmware signing is another essential practice for battery safety systems, particularly for shutdown mechanisms. Unsigned or poorly verified firmware can introduce vulnerabilities, such as backdoors or logic bombs, that may disable safety protocols. A documented incident at an electric vehicle manufacturing plant revealed that an attacker exploited unsigned firmware in a thermal management controller to override temperature thresholds, leading to a thermal runaway event. Post-incident analysis showed that code signing and secure boot mechanisms could have prevented the compromise.

In contrast, BMS cybersecurity (G66) focuses on data integrity, secure communications, and intrusion detection rather than fail-safe hardware controls. BMS architectures often rely on encrypted CAN bus or Ethernet communications for state-of-charge estimation and cell balancing, whereas safety systems prioritize deterministic, hardware-enforced actions. For instance, a BMS may use TLS for secure data transmission, but a safety system requires physically isolated circuits to trigger shutdowns independently of software.

Industrial control system threats targeting battery safety systems have increased in frequency and sophistication. One case study involved a lithium-ion battery storage plant where attackers manipulated relay settings via a compromised engineering workstation, causing false fault detections and unnecessary shutdowns. Forensic analysis traced the attack to a phishing campaign that bypassed multifactor authentication. Another incident at a utility substation demonstrated how malware injected into firmware updates disabled overcurrent protection, resulting in equipment damage.

Mitigation strategies include regular firmware integrity checks, air-gapped backups for safety-critical systems, and runtime anomaly detection for protection relays. A comparative analysis of three large-scale battery installations showed that facilities employing IEC 62443 controls experienced 60% fewer cybersecurity incidents than those relying solely on perimeter defenses.

The convergence of IT and OT in battery systems necessitates a layered security approach. While BMS cybersecurity safeguards data and operational continuity, safety system cybersecurity ensures physical fail-safes remain uncompromised. Future developments may include hardware-based root of trust for shutdown systems and AI-driven threat detection for protection relays, further bridging the gap between proactive and reactive defenses.

In summary, cybersecurity for battery safety systems demands specialized measures tailored to high-reliability environments. Standards like IEC 62443, network segmentation, and firmware signing form the foundation of these defenses, while lessons from industrial control system threats highlight the consequences of inadequate protections. The distinction between BMS and safety system cybersecurity underscores the need for domain-specific solutions in an increasingly interconnected energy landscape.